Chauvinism—excessive adulation of one's own country, its inhabitants, and its culture—was often the consequence of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism. Among Europeans, this tendency to exalt native ways and institutions went hand in hand with the "white man's burden" of British imperialism and, in more extreme and vicious form, with the racist doctrines of the Nazis in Germany. The American people have not been immune to nativistic doctrines, and throughout our history there have been intermittent crusades by overly zealous and ultrapatriotic citizens to preserve the alleged purity of our institutions and national purpose. Although nativism in the United States never attained the genocidal proportions reached in some other nations, xenophobic manifestations have from time to time brought injustice—and even violence—to those who, for one reason or another, failed to conform totally to the so-called American way.

In his definitive study of American nativism from the end of the Civil War to the mid-1920s, historian John Higham isolates three varieties of American xenophobia: anti-Catholicism, racism (the belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxons generally and American Anglo-Saxons in particular), and antiradicalism. Each of these nativistic movements crested at one time or another in the last century of American life. The last—a violent fear of radical subversion—climax twice: first in the "Red Scare" led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer after World War I and more recently in the witchhunts led by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in the decade after World War II. The following selection, taken from Robert K. Murray’s Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919-1920, graphically describes the earlier antiradical crusade and its consequences for the American people. The brief, yet hysterical, post-World War I Red Scare derived from a number of sources: the frenzied drive for conformity and 100 percent Americanism demanded by the administration of Woodrow Wilson to gain national support for participation in World War I; the success of the Bolsheviks in overthrowing the czarist regime in Russia in 1917; the presence in the United States of native- and foreign-born Communists and assorted other radicals; and disillusionment with Wilson’s campaign "to make the world safe for democracy." Although the Red Scare had come to an end by the time Woodrow Wilson left office in March 1921, it left a legacy for the decade that followed. The execution of the Italian anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 that discriminated against southern and eastern Europeans, the rise of the Ku Klux Klan, and the anti-Catholic campaign against Alfred E. Smith when he ran for the presidency in 1928 are clear indications that the hatred and violence stirred up by the Red Scare did not disappear in 1921.
Prior to the late fall of 1919, the federal government had moved rather slowly against the domestic Bolshevik menace. Because of the press of other postwar problems and a preoccupation with the League [of Nations] question, most officials in Washington had not been able to concentrate their thinking on the radical danger. To be sure, politicians talked now and again about the evidences of radicalism in the country and the newspapers played up such statements with zeal. But only a few politicians had yet become really demagogical. In fact, there was every indication that most officials in Washington were less concerned about the radical menace than were their constituents. They had not lost their heads, nor for the most part had they espoused hasty or ill-advised action to attack a nebulous Red threat.

The person most responsible for the subsequent action of the federal government was Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer. Under his direction the federal police power was set in motion so zealously against domestic radicalism that the months of November 1919 to January 1920 have sometimes been labeled "Government by Hysteria" or "Palmer's Reign of Terror." . . .

It has often been charged that Attorney General Palmer undertook his subsequent one-man crusade against the Reds to further his own personal political ambitions. The Quaker from Pennsylvania did, without a doubt, have his eye on the White House and along with many other followers of the New Freedom hoped to be the heir apparent. His qualifications were certainly better than average. He was an ardent Wilsonian, he was a strong supporter of the League, and, for the moment at least, he had the confidence of the President. Moreover, he was an able administrator, a diligent worker, and a proof-tested reformer, having consistently opposed the infamous Penrose machine in Pennsylvania.

There is every indication that by the spring of 1920 Palmer played the Red Scare for all it was worth, hoping to use his aggressive stand against the Reds as the primary means by which he could project himself into the presidency. But in the fall of 1919 it appeared that the attorney general began his attack on radicalism partially to satisfy mounting clamor for the government to act and partially to soothe his own very real fear that the Reds were about to take over the United States. As alien property custodian, he had already gained a wide knowledge of anti-American and anti-democratic propaganda, and hence was much more sensitive to radical outbursts than he otherwise might have been. Moreover, in that capacity he had been made acutely aware of the problem of sabotage and fifth-column activity, and therefore was more suspicious than normal. Then, too, as a Quaker, Palmer was especially opposed to both the godlessness and the violence of the Bolshevik program and thus easily developed an abnormal attitude toward it. It would be difficult to estimate accurately the tremendous effect which the bombing of his own home had on his thinking. The June 2 incident unquestionably heightened Palmer's proclivity for exaggerating the radical menace anyway, and it is understandable how he came to scent "a Bolshevist plot in every item of the day's news."

Shortly after the bombing of his home, Palmer asked for and received an appropriation of $500,000 from Congress to facilitate the Justice Department's
apprehension of those who sought to destroy law and order. Palmer now began his crusade in earnest. On August 1, he established within the Department's Bureau of Investigation the so-called General Intelligence, or antiradical, Division. As its head he appointed young J. Edgar Hoover, charging him with the responsibility of gathering and coordinating all information concerning domestic radical activities. Under the general guidance of bureau chief Flynn and through the unstinting zeal of Hoover, this unit rapidly became the nerve center of the entire Justice Department and by January 1920 made its war on radicalism the department's primary occupation. In fact, there are some indications that both Flynn and Hoover purposely played on the attorney general's fears and exploited the whole issue of radicalism in order to enhance the Bureau of Investigation's power and prestige. Certainly, the hunt for radicals during the 1919-20 period "made" the Bureau of Investigation and started it on the road to becoming the famous FBI of the present day.

In any event, shortly after the creation of the GID, an elaborate card index system was established; over 200,000 cards contained detailed information concerning all known radical organizations, societies, associations, and publications. Set up by Mr. Hoover on the basis of his earlier experience as an employee of the Library of Congress, this index was so constructed that a card for a particular city not only showed the various radical organizations in that area but also their membership rolls, names of officers, and time and place of meetings. By the late fall of 1919, according to Attorney General Palmer, this index also contained the complete case histories of over 60,000 dangerous radicals and housed "a greater mass of data upon this subject than is anywhere else available."

Under the direction of Hoover, the GID became the Justice Department's personal anti-radical propaganda bureau as well as a vast repository of radical information. This was particularly true after the formation of the Communist parties in September. In the ensuing months, the division sent to all major newspapers and periodicals letters signed by the attorney general which began with the statement, "My one desire is to acquaint people like you with the real menace of evil-thinking, which is the foundation of the Red Movement," and ended with exaggerated accounts of domestic Communist activity. The division also distributed copies of the manifestoes of the Third International, the Communist party, and the Communist Labor party and warned Americans against falling for this Bolshevik claptrap. At the same time, the division, with the attorney general's full acquiescence, circulated much propaganda connecting the major fall strikes and the summer race riots with the Communists. It need hardly be added that such propaganda was widely circulated by the general press and that under the circumstances the United States Department of Justice was, itself, one of the major agents fostering Red Scare hysteria in the fall of 1919. . . .

. . . The pressure of ensuing events in the summer and fall of 1919 . . . tipped the scales in favor of more aggressive action, and agitation for the deportation of radical aliens became more vociferous while the failure of the government to deport caused increasing comment. Petitions from state legislatures, business organizations, and patriotic societies flooded Congress demanding that the government do something and that the Justice Department, in particular, be shaken out of its lethargy. Such sentiment
became sufficiently strong by early October that Senator [Miles] Poindexter rose in the Senate and publicly denounced the Justice Department for not creating new "Red Specials" and securing the immediate deportation of all radical agitators. Such assaults on the Justice Department reached a climax when, on October 19, the Senate unanimously adopted a resolution which requested the attorney general "... to advise and inform the Senate whether or not the Department of Justice has taken legal proceedings, and if not, why not, and if so, to what extent, for the arrest and punishment [or deportation] ... of the various persons within the United States who ... have attempted to bring about the forcible overthrow of the Government. ..."

This resolution, together with mounting public clamor, served as the immediate reason for Palmer's turning from less talk to more action. Realizing that in view of the cessation of hostilities with Germany it would be extremely difficult to proceed against radical citizens on grounds of either espionage or sedition, he centered his efforts on the apprehension of radical aliens who would be subject to the deportation provisions of the Alien Law of 1918. This procedure seemed at the moment to be most expedient anyway since the General Intelligence Division estimated that about 90 percent of all domestic radicals were aliens, and it was believed that the native-born element, if left alone, would never prove really dangerous. On this basis, orders were sent to Bureau of Investigation agents and confidential informants that their major activities "should be particularly directed to persons, not citizens of the United States, with a view of obtaining deportation cases."

On November 7 ... Attorney General Palmer gave the public and Congress the action they had been waiting for by unloosing a nationwide raid against the Union of Russian Workers. Founded in 1907, this organization had its headquarters in the Russian People's House, 133 East 15th Street, New York City, and, according to its own statements, was composed of "atheists, communists and anarchists." It believed in the complete overthrow of all institutions of government and the confiscation of all wealth through the violence of social revolution. The estimated membership of the organization was 4000.

Although 250 officers and members of the URW were seized in simultaneous raids in eleven other cities, the main blow fell on the New York headquarters. The People's House raid was conducted with mathematical precision, bureau agents remaining outside the building in parked cars until the signal was given. At that moment, they closed in rapidly and took the establishment by surprise. Several huge truck-loads of radical propaganda were confiscated, and about 200 men and women were violently assisted out of the building by a special riot squad and driven away to Justice Department headquarters at 13 Park Row for questioning. The New York Times reported that some of the occupants had been "badly beaten by the police ... their heads wrapped in bandages testifying to the rough manner in which they had been handled."

As a result of the questioning, only thirty-nine of those seized were finally held. Of the others, a few were found to be American citizens and were immediately released; the rest were simple workingmen of Russian nationality who spoke little or no English and who belonged to the organization for almost every conceivable reason
except to promote revolution. Nevertheless, despite their obvious ignorance concerning the real aims of the IIRW, certain of these prisoners were held for excessively long periods of time before they were given their freedom. This was particularly true at Hartford, Connecticut, where some arrested members were kept in jail five months before even receiving a hearing.

In spite of the obvious injustices involved and the small catch of truly revolutionary characters, the nation seemed delighted with the raids. To the government, and especially to Attorney General Palmer, went unstinting praise for having acted "In the Nick of Time" and having nipped "a gigantic plot" in the bud. Suddenly, the attorney general became the most popular figure in the nation and found himself enthroned as the third in a triumvirate of great saviors of the country - first Hanson, then Coolidge, now Palmer. His prestige was perhaps all the more enhanced since the government was temporarily leaderless; Woodrow Wilson lay stricken in the White House while the ship of state floundered helplessly in the rough seas of fear and reaction. To the man on the street, Palmer was "running the administration," "a lion-hearted man [who] has brought order out of chaos," and "A Strong Man of Peace." Newspapers excitedly described him as "a tower of strength to his countrymen" and declared that his actions brought "thrills of joy to every American."

The federal raid of November 7 had proved an excellent laboratory experiment. It had shown that if any raid was to be followed by deportations, close cooperation with the Department of Labor was absolutely essential because of its jurisdiction over deportation matters. Therefore, in laying plans for his new move, the attorney general attempted to bring Labor Department officials into closer harmony with his own views. In this attempt, he was aided by the fact that, at the moment, Secretary of Labor [William B.] Wilson was ill and Assistant Secretary Post was otherwise occupied. This left John W. Abercrombie, solicitor of the Department of Labor, but in reality a member of the Justice Department, to function as acting labor secretary. Naturally, he proved most cooperative. Moreover, the Labor Department's top official on deportation affairs, Commissioner General of Immigration Anthony J. Caminetti, was currently evidencing as much hysteria over the Red menace as was the attorney general. Therefore he also fell easily into line.

After consultation with these men, it was unanimously decided that alien members of both the Communist party and the Communist Labor party were subject to deportation under the 1918 Alien Act. On this basis, Acting Secretary of Labor Abercrombie signed on December 27 more than 3000 warrants for the arrest of known alien adherents to the two Communist organizations and gave such warrants to the Justice Department for execution. Four days later, on the advice of Commissioner Caminetti (who in turn was acting upon a suggestion made to him by one of Palmer's emissaries from the Justice Department), Abercrombie also made an important change in the rule governing the procedure of deportation arrest hearings. Prior to December 31 the rule had read: "At the beginning of the hearing under the warrant of arrest, the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant . . . and shall be apprised that he may be represented by counsel." The rule, as changed, read as follows: "Preferably at the
beginning of the hearing . . . or at any rate as soon as such hearing has proceeded sufficiently in the development of the facts to protect the Government's interests, the alien shall be allowed to inspect the warrant . . . and shall be apprised that thereafter he may be represented by counsel."

It should be noted at this point that deportation involved no criminal proceeding since it was not regarded as punishment. There was no judge or jury and the case was handled administratively through the secretary of labor by immigration officials who heard the case and rendered the decision. The government was perfectly within its rights in changing the grounds and procedures for deportation hearings at any time, for deportable aliens obviously did not have the protection of the ex post facto clause in the Constitution.

But even though no criminal trial was involved and the whole matter was merely an administrative process, it was generally understood that the alien did have certain safeguards - namely those in the Sixth Amendment such as the "right to a...public trial ...to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." The alien also had two possibilities for relief from an adverse administrative decision. The secretary of labor might personally review the record and reverse any deportation decision, or the alien might obtain a writ of habeas corpus which would bring his case before a federal judge, but only if it could be shown that the deportation proceedings had been manifestly unfair.

For these reasons it becomes obvious why Attorney General Palmer did not try to detect and prosecute actual crimes of radicals against the United States. This would have required an indictment and a trial by jury, whether such crimes were committed by citizens or aliens. Rather, he relied on the administrative process for the apprehension and deportation of radical aliens and therefore circumvented most normal legal procedures. Moreover, by Abercrombie's change in the hearing rule, even under the administrative process the alien's opportunity for an able defense of his position was considerably weakened. Hence, through shrewd collusion with certain Labor Department and immigration officials, Palmer assured himself greater success in his drive on radicalism than if he had elected to arrest radical aliens as criminals and thus subject his whole anti-Red program to the vagaries of the courts of law.

Confident now that all was in readiness and that large-scale deportations offered the best solution to the domestic radical problem, the attorney general set the night of January 2, 1920, as the time for his all-out drive on the two Communist parties. Seven days before, on December 27, Palmer sent specific orders to Bureau of Investigation district chiefs instructing them on exactly what to do. They were told to arrange with their undercover agents, some of whom had quietly slipped into radical ranks and had assumed the role of agitators of the wildest type, to have meetings of the two Communist organizations called for the night set if possible because such action would facilitate the making of arrests. Field agents were instructed to "obtain all documentary evidence possible," to secure "charters, meeting minutes, membership books, dues books, membership correspondence, etc.," and to allow no person arrested to communicate with any outside person until permission was specifically granted. Such
permission could only come from Flynn, Hoover, or Palmer. Further orders specified that if an individual claimed American citizenship "he must produce documentary evidence of same" and that upon arrest "aliens should be searched thoroughly; if found in groups in meeting rooms, line them up against the wall and there search them."

Resultant action could not have been more stunning or more spectacular. On January 2, more than 4000 suspected radicals were rounded up in thirty-three major cities, covering twenty-three states. Virtually every local Communist organization in the nation was affected; practically every leader of the movement, national or local, was put under arrest. Often such arrests were made without the formality of warrants as bureau agents entered bowling alleys, pool halls, cafés, club rooms, and even homes, and seized everyone in sight. Families were separated; prisoners were held incommunicado and deprived of their right to legal counsel. According to the plan, those suspected radicals who were American citizens were not detained by federal agents, but were turned over to state officials for prosecution under state syndicalist laws. All aliens, of course, were incarcerated by the federal authorities and reserved for deportation hearings.

In the New England area, raids were conducted in such towns as Boston, Chelsea, Brockton, Nashua, Manchester, and Portsmouth. In all, about 800 persons were seized of whom approximately half were taken to the immigrant station in Boston and then shipped to Deer Island in Boston Harbor. In this shifting process, the prisoners were forced to march in chains from the immigrant station to the dock - a fact which newspapers played up as attesting to their dangerous, violent character. Upon arriving at Deer Island the prisoners found conditions deplorable; heat was lacking, sanitation was poor, and restrictions holding them incommunicado were rigidly enforced. One captive plunged five stories to this death, another went insane, and two others died of pneumonia.

The remaining half of the 800 who were not sent to Deer Island were released after two or three days when it was determined they were in no way connected with the radical movement. For example, thirty-nine bakers in Lynn, Massachusetts, arrested on suspicion of holding a revolutionary caucus, were released when it was learned that they had come together on the evening of January 2 for the inoffensive purpose of establishing a cooperative bakery. In Boston, a woman named Minnie Federman, who was mistakenly arrested in her bedroom at 6 A.M. on January 3, was released without even an apology when it was discovered belatedly that she was an American citizen and had no interest whatsoever in revolution.

In New York and Pennsylvania the pattern was the same. In New York City more than 400 individuals were arrested as the Communist party headquarters and the Rand School bore the brunt of the federal raid. Prisoners were rounded up and taken to 13 Park Row where they were questioned by GID agents before being sent on to Ellis Island or released. In these New York arrests it seems that brutality was practiced to an excessive degree. Prisoners in sworn affidavits later testified to the violent treatment they had received. One claimed he had been beaten by a Justice Department operative without any explanation; another maintained he was struck repeatedly on the head with a blackjack. Another alien asserted that his glasses had been knocked off by an agent, who then without the slightest provocation struck him in the face. Still another testified:
"I was struck on my head, and . . . was attacked by one detective, who knocked me down again, sat on my back, pressing me down to the floor with his knee and bending my body back until blood flowed out of my mouth and nose . . . after which . . . I was questioned and released."

Meanwhile, in Philadelphia, more than 100 were arrested and the "third degree" was as shamefully practiced as in New York. In the Pittsburgh area, 115 individuals were seized although warrants had been issued for only twenty. Indeed, one Pittsburgh man was missed by his friends for almost a month before they discovered he was in jail, having been arrested without warrant and then held without explanation or bail.

In New Jersey, such towns as Jersey City, Passaic, Newark, Hoboken, Paterson, and Trenton experienced similar Red roundups. Altogether, about 500 arrests were made, but the majority were finally released for insufficient evidence. Again many arrests were made without warrant. For instance, one man was arrested about 10 P. M. while walking along Newark's Charlton Street simply because he "looked like a radical." Another, much to his surprise, was seized when he stopped to inquire what all the commotion was about. This zeal to ferret out dangerous radicals caused government agents not only to make many unjust arrests such as these but also to jump to ridiculous conclusions. In New Brunswick, while a Socialist Club was being raided, the drawings of a phonograph invention were found and were immediately forwarded to demolition experts because the raiders thought they represented "the internal mechanism of various types of bombs."

In the Midwest, the raids at Chicago and Detroit were particularly severe. In the Detroit raid about 800 persons were arrested and imprisoned from three to six days in a dark, windowless, narrow corridor in the city's antiquated Federal Building. The prisoners were forced to sleep on the bare floor and stand in long lines for access to the solitary toilet. Some, unable to wait, were forced to urinate in the corridor itself, and, as the custodian later testified, "Before many days . . . the stench was quite unbearable." It was later discovered that the prisoners were denied all food for the first twenty-four hours and thereafter were fed largely on what their families brought to them. Including among their number "citizens and aliens, college graduates and laborers, skilled mechanics making $15 a day and boys not yet out of short trousers," these 800 prisoners were closely questioned by bureau agents who finally released 300 by the end of the sixth day when it was proved that they had not even a cursory interest in the domestic radical movement.

Meanwhile, about 140 of those remaining were transferred from the Federal Building to the Detroit Municipal Building. En route these individuals, who had been unable to shave or bathe for almost a week, served as excellent subjects for press photographers, and local Detroit newspapers ran their pictures as examples of the unkempt, dirty, filthy Bolshevik terrorists the government had netted in its raids. Upon their arrival at the Municipal Building, the prisoners were placed in a room twenty-four feet by thirty feet which originally had been designed to hold offenders no longer than three to four hours. This "bullpen," as it was called, had only one window, a stone floor, and several wooden benches; yet the men remained here a whole week and were fed almost solely on food sent to them by their relatives. Indeed, conditions under which
these prisoners lived were actually so wretched that even the Detroit press finally displayed some sympathy for them, and a citizens' committee was created to investigate their situation. This committee subsequently discovered that most of these "dangerous radicals" were but plain, ignorant foreigners who were completely unaware of why they were being so treated.

In Chicago, a most peculiar set of circumstances arose. For five months, state and city officials had laid careful plans for their own drive on radicalism in the Chicago area, and had finally decided on January 1 as the date for such a move. Much to their dismay they then learned that the Justice Department had planned its foray for January 2. Cook County officials persisted in their desire to conduct a raid of their own, and, as a result, raids were held a day apart on radicals in that area.

The state raid of January 1 involved some seventy or more radical clubs or gatherings and netted between 150 and 200 prisoners. As a result of these incursions, some eighty-five Communists, among them "Big Bill" Haywood and Rose Pastor Stokes, were arraigned in Chicago on criminal anarchy charges.

The federal raid which followed on January 2 was therefore somewhat anticlimactic. However, federal officials did nab 225 additional suspected radicals and after questioning held about 80 for deportation. One interesting sidelight on the Chicago raids was a riot which broke out in the municipal jail shortly after the various arrests were made. It seems that the jail's "patriotic" prisoners took violent exception to the fact that Reds were being thrown in the same cells with them. Remarked the Seattle Times "There are some things at which even a Chicago crook draws the line."

In the West and Far West, while raids were conducted, they were not especially significant. Most radicals of any importance, particularly in the Far West, had already been apprehended in the various state raids following the Centralia massacre. Hence, the present forays were carried out only in a cursory manner and arrests were few in number. In Los Angeles, one was arrested; in Portland, twenty; Denver, eight; and Des Moines, sixteen. Only in Kansas City was there much activity, and there 100 were taken and 35 held.

The January raids dazzled the public. The mass of Americans cheered the hunters from the sidelines while Attorney General Palmer once again was hailed as the savior of the nation. In view of the obvious abridgement of civil liberties which the raids entailed, such support can only be explained on the basis that the public mind was under the influence of a tremendous social delirium - a colossal fear which condoned monstrous procedures and acts. Against a background of the three major fall strikes, the Centralia murders, and exaggerated press and official claims, that fear seemed so real it was positively overpowering. Said the Washington Evening Star: "This is no mere scare, no phantom of heated imagination - it is a cold, hard, plain fact." As far as the deleterious effect on civil liberties was concerned, the Washington Post exclaimed, "There is no time to waste on hairsplitting over infringement of liberty. . . ."

Agreeing therefore that the raids were a cause for satisfaction and willing to overlook the many dangers and injustices involved, most journals were now quick to counsel a rapid follow-through. The immediate deportation of the prisoners, variously described as "the kind of cranks that murder Presidents" or "send bombs through the
mails to statesmen," was forcefully demanded. In fact, such action was regarded "as necessary as cauterizing a wound to prevent gangrene." Under such headlines as "ALL ABOARD FOR THE NEXT SO\Injector ARK," the press advocated that "ships be made ready quickly and the passengers put aboard."

As to the success of the raids, Palmer and the Bureau of Investigation spoke in glowing terms. The attorney general claimed the raids "halted the advance of 'red radicalism' in the United States," while Flynn maintained they marked the beginning of the end of organized revolutionaries in this country.

As a matter of fact, the raids did have a devastating effect on the domestic radical movement. James Cannon later maintained that the movement disintegrated for the time being. Benjamin Gitlow testified the raids struck terror into the hearts of alien members of the two Communist parties and hurt membership tremendously. It was true that for many weeks after the government action the radical press ceased its activities and meetings of the Communist organizations were suspended. Perhaps the best indication of the effect of the raids can be seen in a report made in February 1920 by the American delegate to the Amsterdam meeting of the Bureau of Propaganda of the Third International. He claimed at that time that the January raids had so wrecked the Communist movement in the United States that it could not be counted on to exert any influence whatsoever.

While satisfied up to this point with the success of his antiradical program, Attorney General Palmer now allowed no lag to develop. With the aid of Flynn and Hoover, he intensified the department's propaganda campaign until it reached its height in late January 1920. Large numbers of antiradical articles and cartoons were sent to the nation's newspapers and magazines without charge, the postage being prepaid by the Department of Justice itself. A sample cartoon, secured by the Justice Department from the New York Tribune and used with its permission, depicted Uncle Sam as a farmer weeding up thistles, each one of which had a Bolshevik head, while in the background a woman named "America" was replacing the thistles with pure "American" grass seed. "Give the American Bluegrass a Show," it said.

At the same time, Palmer vigorously continued his drive to secure some kind of peacetime sedition legislation in order to give the federal government the power necessary to deal with citizen radicals effectively. Shortly after the January raids, he appealed to Congress for such legislation, underlining the potential danger which such citizens presented to the country.

Palmer also promised the nation more action to rid the country of all alien agitators. He declared there would be more raids and that on the basis of what already had been done there would be at least 2720 deportations. Like a barker in charge of a colossal sideshow, the attorney general promised New Yorkers, in particular, the exhilarating spectacle of "a second, third, and fourth Soviet Ark sailing down their beautiful harbor in the near future."